

Transition to the “Eternal Present”

Nishida Kitarō’s Notion of Self and Responsibility in Our Context Today

Yoko Arisaka

Transitions—we live in a world of rapid and complex transitions of all sorts, from the personal level to the global.¹ Transitions in the technical domain as well as their cultural transformations have been remarkable as well as disturbing in the past 50 years. Transitions across geographical locations and languages are getting more blurred as the Internet takes over our communications and commerce. Generations past, present, and future deal with these transitions in different ways and we adapt to the constantly changing environment. We are necessarily “involved” and constantly “in-between”—we have no choice but to live the transitions that are everywhere upon us.² In this process, we are subjects as well as objects of transitions that define our life-worlds and history.

To embrace such a world, I believe there is still an insight we could gain from Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), regarded as the founder of

1. I would like to thank Yukiko Kuwayama, Francesca Greco, and Leon Krings for the editing of this volume as well as for the initial invitation and local organization of the 4th ENOJP Conference in Hildesheim in 2018, for which this presentation was one of the keynotes.

2. For recent studies on being “in-between” in its ontological as well as ethical ramifications, see DAVID 2019 and ORTEGA 2016.

modern Japanese philosophy. There are numerous books and interpretations connected to the technical aspects of Nishida scholarship; the aim of my chapter is not to discuss the details of his theory, but rather to present a possible line of interpretation that tries to unify Nishida's lifelong insight—from the theory of pure experience to his last writings. For specialists of Nishida's philosophy, what I discuss may not be really new. But for those who are not familiar with Nishida, I hope it will offer some kind of an interpretive line on what I think is particularly interesting in Nishida in the overall philosophical context, beyond the historical significance of his philosophy.

In order to outline a line of interpretation that would be, in my view, important for discussing Nishida today in our historical and global contexts, I discuss the following: First, I focus on the philosophical insights of Nishida that refer to the personal involvements of our current selves; I begin from the theory of pure experience and trace the standpoint of the I-as-acting-subject, or what might be called the “seeing without a seer” (見るものなき見ること). This standpoint remains in Nishida's theory throughout the different phases of his thought in numerous forms, and in the first part I discuss its relation to the notion of the “eternal present” (永遠の今). Second, I discuss this stance of the acting subject in the context of Nishida's dialectical and historical theory. I will highlight how a notion of responsibility is inherent in this theory in order to show how it is helpful in thinking about our place in the world today.

THE I AS SUBJECT: “SEEING WITHOUT A SEER”

As with many historical figures in philosophy, there are many ways to “tease out” a theme or a strand of interpretation to highlight an idea or insight of a philosopher, in order to follow a particular theoretical focus. Nishida is no exception. The conventional interpretation among scholars regarding the development of Nishida's corpus as a whole is to read the early theory of “pure experience” as rather

psychologistic and show how Nishida subsequently tried to avoid psychologism and subjectivism to develop a more metaphysical theory of the will (following Fichte) as “pure act” (*Tathandlung*), which later became systematized as his “logic of place” (場所の論理) based on the notion of “absolute nothingness” (絶対無). In order to avoid a misinterpretation of his approach as “empty” metaphysics and to give more historical significance to it (following Hegel and Marx), Nishida simultaneously emphasized his theory of place as the self-determining “dialectical universal” (弁証法的一般者) that concretely involves historical subjects and their individual actions, interpreting them as agents involved in the historical world through “acting intuition” (行為的直観), as well as through their intentions and free will. In this line of conventional interpretation, one could perhaps discern a shift from the “first-person” standpoint of the early theory of pure experience—in which the theorist takes the standpoint of the I—to the “third-person” perspective of a “God’s eye view” which grasps the metaphysics of place and its dialectical universal from the theoretical standpoint of a philosopher that does not appear within the theory. The standpoint of the (first-person) self becomes integrated in the system as the “self as object,” but the theoretical standpoint that sees this self-as-object working within the dialectical system is often interpreted as being no longer the standpoint of the “I-as-subject” of pure experience.

To clarify, the four levels or standpoints involving the self are:

1. The immediate self-as-subject, which I also call the “seeing-self”; this is the I-as-pure-experience, the immediacy of the *noetic I* that cannot itself be an object. This is the main topic of this chapter.

2. This seeing-self is often objectified, because it cannot otherwise be discussed as the noetic I or the self-as-subject; so the moment we reflect on the seeing-self, it is actually grasped as a “seen-self,” as a “*noematic* object” through acts of reflection (of the seeing-self). This seen-self is the self of psychology, of inner states, of consciousness studies, of phenomenology; it is an activity of the self-as-subject that is objectified.

3. This seen-self (self-as-object, analyzed in its acts-as-subject), when seen from a theoretical standpoint of the God's eye view, becomes an object among other objects. This is the standpoint of natural and social sciences, history, the majority of traditional philosophy, even including Nishida's theory of dialectical history. In his theory of the historical world, each agent is such an acting "person" that interacts with the environment (including other such agents). In this picture, the seen-self does not stand as an object of reflection "for me, the seeing-self" but is simply represented as one being among other beings in a theory.

4. However, even in this theoretical representation of history (with acting subjects and their environments), the unthematized God's eye view of the analyzer/theorist is actually no other than the seeing-self, the immediate self-as-subject (the first standpoint). Regardless of the content of representation or theorizing (pure experience, the self, or history), this ultimate seeing-self is ubiquitous and never disappears; it is manifested in my fundamental "field of being" for which there is experience and world at all and in the first place. (The seeing-self as field of being is already present in the second standpoint, while the "real" seeing-self of the first standpoint can never become objectified. As such, it is an "absolute nothingness" which manifests itself *as* being.)

The interpretation which claims that the theory of pure experience is "psychologistic" reads pure experience in the sense of the second standpoint, i.e., as an immediate stream of consciousness. To the extent that Nishida must "write about" the "theory" of pure experience, this misunderstanding is perhaps unavoidable, as he himself admits. However, pure experience as immediacy also entails the first standpoint, as referring to the acts of the seeing-self. Let me tease out this way of reading Nishida, one which sustains the standpoint of the seeing-self throughout. Again, I am not looking for a psychological standpoint focusing on the subjective content of a self, such as sensations and perceptions. Rather, it is the ongoing act of the concrete perspectival cen-

ter as such that is the self—it is a *noesis*, a meaning-giving-activity that cannot itself be an object.

The theory of pure experience refers to the immediately involved experiential field of this seeing-self, in so far as one begins from the simple fact of “immediate experience” prior to the establishment of subject and object. In Nishida’s words, “in immediate experience, there is not yet the distinction between subject and object.”³ This is often misunderstood as a kind of psychologism, but if pure experience is prior to the subject-object distinction, it cannot refer to the psychological contents or the consciousness of a presupposed subject. The theory of pure experience is rather something like an “experiential ontology,” a new kind of ontology based on the immediacy of the self simultaneously opening up to the world, not unlike Heidegger’s *Dasein* as being-in-the-world (which is also not a psychological self yet retains the self-ness in its ontology).⁴

According to Nishida’s approach, “reality” is this “field of experience” that is prior to the individuation of “experiences” belonging to persons; as such, it is not a psychological notion but rather an ontological “field” or a “ground” that contains in itself principles that define what would be subsequently analyzable as subjective and objective. Thus, according to Nishida, “it is not that the individual has experience, but in Experience emerges the individual. The individual experience is only a small part of Experience.”⁵ This experiential field, moreover, cannot become an object, as it is always that “through which” or “in which” all contents show themselves as such. This process of “showing itself” is the activities of the seeing-self.

I argue that even in Nishida’s abstract logic of place or his theory of the dialectical universal, this seeing-self never disappeared. Nishida

3. NKZ I: 29. All of the translations from the Japanese are by the author.

4. See NISHIDA 1992. For the notion of experiential ontology and for the comparisons with James, see FEENBERG and ARISAKA 1990.

5. NKZ I: 51.

himself writes in his third Preface to *An Inquiry into the Good*⁶ (originally published in 1911) in 1936:

Looking from today's perspective, the standpoint of this book may be considered as that of consciousness and it is rather psychologistic. It is understandable that it might be criticized as such. However, even as I wrote this book, my ideas were not simply those of consciousness. The standpoint of "pure experience" became that of "absolute will" through the influence of Fichte's notion of *Tathandlung* in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness*, which in turn went through another transformation and turned into the standpoint of *Place*, mediated by Greek philosophy, in the latter half of *From That Which Acts to That Which Sees*. That was my attempt to systematize my thinking. The philosophy of place, then, became concretized as the dialectical universal, and this standpoint became again "immediate" as the standpoint of acting intuition. What has been discussed in this book, the world of immediate experience or pure experience, is now understood as historical reality. Thus the world of acting intuition, the world of *poiesis*, is actually no other than the world of pure experience.⁷

As this quote indicates, throughout his attempts at systematization, Nishida never abandoned the initial insights of his early theory of pure experience even in his later, metaphysically more robustly developed theories. It is therefore not an incoherent line of interpretation to follow the development of the initial perspective of the seeing-self even in the later theories.

In order to follow this line of interpretation, another key concept I find helpful is the notion of the "eternal present" (永遠の今), at times also called the "absolute present" (絶対的現在), a term that began to appear in Nishida's writings sporadically from the early 1930s onwards.⁸

6. 『善の研究』, NKZ 1: 1-159.

7. NKZ 1: 6f.

8. The first essays in which Nishida explicitly discusses the notion of the "eternal present" are "My Notion of the Self-Determination of Absolute Nothingness" 「私の絶対無の自覚的限定といふもの」, "The Self-Determination of the Eternal Present" 「永遠の今の自己限定」, and "I and Thou" 「私と汝」, all contained in *The Self-Determination of*

The “eternal present” is the Here/Now that “simultaneously unifies the past and the future; it is the present at the center that determines a world.”⁹ Past, present and future are not on a timeline, as it were, they are the “determinations” or “expressions” of the Here/Now, the eternal present which is simultaneously both the past and the future:

The absolute present that determines temporality—one can consider this as the self-determination of absolute nothingness, with multiple centers and without borders. In this sense the absolute present can begin anywhere and instantly gathers infinite past and future at the point of the present—such is the eternal present. Time is established through the self-determination of the eternal present.¹⁰

What is interesting is that Nishida first connects the I (the seeing-self) to the eternal present (through our actions), then both to the self-determination of absolute nothingness. To quote:

The moment the contents of the eternal present get intuitively determined, there is the I [自己, the self as the I]. The content of the true self is no other than the content of the eternal present; the outside becomes the inside. Our world does not flow from the past to the future. The past flows into the present and the future to the present as well. Our world flows from the present to the present.... That the present determines itself to be the past or the future—the self-determination of the eternal present—that a world is determined as the present at the center—all this means that “we act.” Through action, we are constantly in touch with the eternal present. Our actions always arise from it.... What is considered the self-determination of the eternal present is the self-determination of absolute nothingness as the universal place itself. This is the true meaning of intuition. Actions can be thought of as that which unifies the irrational, as the self-determination of the eternal

Nothingness 『無の自覚的限定』, published in 1932 (NKZ 6). Takaya Shōko traces the origin of Nishida’s use of the term in his readings of St. Augustine and Meister Eckhart. See TAKAYA 2020.

9. NKZ 6: 133.

10. NKZ 6: 188.

present. At the same time, this is the self “seeing itself” as the Now determines itself.¹¹

The self as the I, the seeing-self (not the seen-self) is identified as the dynamic eternal present; Nishida sometimes describes this *noetic I* as located at the center of the “circle without circumference.”

If one follows Nishida’s intuition (or if one is familiar with the Mahayana notion of *sunyata*), one can certainly see how this is a development from his earlier theory of pure experience, expressed in another articulation. The immediacy of the Here/Now is the moment of “seeing without subject and object” prior to reflection, the field of pure experience. It is the ongoing Here/Now, the eternal present, which unifies reality as it appears, and the seeing-self—the noetic I—is, as it were, always at its center. But this seeing-self is not mere consciousness—it is an embodied self, an acting-self, a series of actions which are embedded in history, dialectically interacting and co-creating at all times. Precisely through this process of dialectical determinations of our embodied selves, our present is the *lived present*, the eternal present that is constantly born. And this, the whole dialectical world that is the eternal present, is the self-determination of absolute nothingness. If this is so, the self-determination of absolute nothingness is not some mysterious metaphysical occurrence, but it is happening *right now* through our very embodied selves, at all times. In Nishida’s words, “that which is truly concrete existence—which is the self-determination of absolute nothingness—is our individual selves as the self-determination of the eternal present.”¹²

Here lies Nishida’s novelty and in my view, the most interesting idea that makes his philosophy relevant today. In analyzing Nishida’s corpus as a whole, the development of his theory from the so-called psychologistic theory of pure experience to the more systematic and ontological theory of place, and further to the dialectical theory of the

11. NKZ 6: 133f.

12. NKZ 6: 211.

co-creation of acting self and historical world, could be read as a development from pure experience to a system of historical “reality,” a shift from the self to the world, but in fact, if one understands the self as the seeing-self, this perspective never left Nishida’s theory throughout.

But the story goes further. Even when one takes a theoretical perspective and reads and analyzes Nishida, for instance when we read and analyze the self-determination of absolute nothingness as the self-determination of the self as eternal present (and thereby project his whole theory as an object of analysis), the seeing-self is always at hand in the act of reading/thinking; in fact, *this* is the real subject of reality at all times, the unfolding of the eternal present right now, just as you read these lines as the unfolding of the present (the eternal now).

So, *this* seeing-self, that is, you right now who is reading these lines, turns out to be the ineliminable “field” in which all that is to be seen, thought, acted upon—in short, the whole of reality—takes place, and this is what Nishida has been referring to, but the reference is not to the content of our experience but to your present self as you are reading this essay, your actual Here/Now.

So far as I know, there is no philosophical theory that tries to thematize and systematize this unfolding Here/Now of ourselves at this very moment, but this is in fact what Nishida’s theory tries to articulate. In a trite way, this is the “Zen element” in Nishida, though he himself hardly refers to Mahayana Buddhism.¹³

Thus it turns out that the content of Nishida’s theory is necessarily not theoretically graspable but ubiquitously available if we stop and reflect—without turning such reflecting into an object of our reflection. Moreover, if this is true, then what Nishida refers to is not his

13. Nishida mentions Mahayana Buddhism once in discussing the eternal present in “What I call the Self-Aware Determination of Absolute Nothingness” [私の絶対無の自覚的限定といふもの] (1932): “The true meaning of Mahayana Buddhism is to touch the bottom of facts themselves, one step at a time; that which has form, that is the shadow of the formless.” (NKZ 6: 155) Explicit references to Mahayana Buddhism occur in his “Logic of Place and Religious Worldview” [場所の論理と宗教的世界観], an essay he wrote two months before his death in 1945.

theory, his writings, what happened in history, or even the theory of absolute nothingness, in his corpus or his time. It is rather the *living present*, our embodied present in the Here/Now, 2020 and beyond.

This is why Nishida's theory is *necessarily* relevant today. He is still speaking to us. It in fact refers to our very present moment, as we live, and we are called upon to become aware of this fact. The force of Nishida's theory in this sense lies in our taking full account of the living present. We read, discuss, and analyze Nishida and his entire theory as content, but in fact, this very content is not what Nishida is writing about, instead he is constantly referring our Here/Now as it unfolds, regardless of the content. We in fact constantly *enact* what Nishida calls the "self-identity of absolutely contradictory opposites" (絶対矛盾的自己同一), the contradictory self-identity of pure nothingness out of which we all become what we are together with the contents of our reality at this very moment.¹⁴ Keeping this point in mind, let me now turn to the second issue, the historical context, which I see as relevant to situating Nishida in today's framework.

HISTORY AND THE DIALECTICAL WORLD

From the mid- to late 1930s, Nishida began to develop his theory in a much more concrete framework.¹⁵ Already in the late 1920s, the abstract theory of the logic of place as absolute nothingness acquired a distinctively historical twist, influenced by Hegel and Marx's dialectic. The historical development (qua self-development of the place of absolute nothingness) now takes place through what Nishida calls "acting intuition" (行為の直観), a neologism for a process that consists both of "action" (行為), and "intuition" (直観). Historical development is to be understood as the dialectic of the subject taking part in the creation of the world (object) which in turn forms

14. This point is also discussed in ARISAKA 2017.

15. See, for example, *Fundamental Problems of Philosophy I and II* 『哲学の根本問題』 (NKZ 7), published in 1933 and 1934.

the subject. The original insight of the theory of pure experience—that the original “experiential field” is prior to all distinctions and only later develops into subject and object—is now historicized and concretized through dialectical action. The historical subject negates or “transcends” itself in its becoming the historical environment, while at the same time it negates the environment to become itself again, and a similar process occurs among the historical agents, the intersubjective we, and their history.

In his political writings, the process of the dialectical, acting self and its co-determination with the environment gets applied to the relations among nations. For example, in *The Principle of the New World Order* (1943)¹⁶ the metaphysical-dialectical theory of Nishida’s “Historical World,” which posits all entities to be mediated through the process of historical action–creation–mediation, was applied to a theory of the “Age of the Self-Realization of the World” through nation-building.¹⁷ Every nation, in order to establish itself, would do so through a negation of itself (in the recognition of the other/difference) as well as a negation of the other (to establish itself as the other of the other) and through this dialectic each nation affirms itself in relation to others. In this process, the particularities of cultures are preserved, and the essential interdependence of nations is recognized. Through this process on a global scale, the “realization of the Global-World” (世界的世界の自覚) is achieved.

Notice how easy it is at this point to slip into the theoretical, God’s eye view perspective and “see” the acting self as one of the objects interacting and co-creating the historical world. Reading Nishida’s historical theory requires this theoretical perspective from which the devel-

16. 「世界新秩序の原理」, NKZ 12: 426–34.

17. I do not refer to the postwar controversies surrounding this essay and the role of Nishida during the Pacific War here, but this is a subject that has been amply analyzed. For an English translation of the essay as well as a summary of the controversy, see ARISAKA 2017. For a collection of essays on the connection between Japanese philosophy and nationalism, see HEISIG and MARALDO 1994. For further discussions on the politics of Nishida and the Kyoto School, see also GOTO-JONES 2005 and GOTO-JONES 2008.

opment of history and the dialectical world can be grasped. The acting self becomes seen (from a “view from nowhere” as it were) as one of the essential elements in this historical process. But as mentioned above, the seeing-self—that is the unthematized standpoint of our current, reading self that is nonetheless there at all times—is only hidden in this theoretical perspective.

In a highly multifaceted world as the one we are living in today, such a dialectical theory of identity-formation is not only applicable but also helpful in negotiating multi-layered relations among groups—be it nations, cultural subgroups, political identities. An identity formation necessarily involves a recognition of the other as well as oneself as the other of the other, and it is here that the power negotiations occur. Nishida’s context was the rise of Asian solidarity against the encroaching Euro-American imperialism during the Pacific War, but the same theoretical framework could be used to discuss today’s problems of multiculturalism, intercultural dialogue, and global diversity, as discussed by recent Nishida scholars such as Bret Davis, John Maraldo and Gereon Kopf.¹⁸

CONCLUSION: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ETERNAL PRESENT

Let me now put the two discussions together. Nishida’s ontology stipulates that the content of his theory is no “theory” at all, but rather our lived present that can never be turned into an object as such. It can be analyzed and systematized as if it were an object, just as Nishida attempts, but what he refers to are the immediate actions that we are constantly involved with, immersed in our surroundings, even in the act of thinking or reflection. It refers to the nonobjectifiable Here/Now that is the “I myself” at all times, as you are reading this essay in your room, in some city, in some country, post 2020.

18. See, for example, DAVIS 2006, DAVIS 2013, KOPF 2011, and MARALDO 1995.

Next, this “field of experience” that is the Here/Now, as it were, has the dialectical structure that continuously makes the self and its world. This existential opening unfolds the world through our concrete involvement. The eternal present is already an ongoing field that unifies all of its elements.

In this process, the self or I is not simply a thing among other things. It is a creative self that interacts, and what it does “matters” in the immediate appropriation of the future for the enactment of the present and the making of the past. To put it in the first-person language: What I think and do “makes a difference” in terms of what kind of personal interactions, futures (both immediate and far), and personal histories I create. To the extent that I am constantly involved with others in this ongoing process, I am a co-maker of history together with others, and I can make decisions in this way or another, thereby making a difference in terms of outcome, however small. If this is the case, then the responsibilities for the decisions and interactions are also an inalienable aspect of myself. I can orient myself according to my view of the world, and I can inform myself about its process. I can develop moral sensibilities, hear the call of a Thou (as others are not “person-things” but also seer-selves like me), or feel empathy toward others, learn about ethics, think about a gentler society or a world with less suffering. (I can of course do the opposite, but I would still be responsible doing so.)

Such decisions may appear to “come in the near future” as if it is a linear process, but in fact it is actually the Here/Now that we drag and postpone. I could say to myself, “well but it doesn’t make a difference in the end,” and while that may be true, this is still a decision and a stance one has committed oneself to, actively or passively. I can dwell in the past, whatever this may entail personally or historically, but that too is an ongoing unfolding of the Here/Now that I have committed myself to. In this way I am rather an *agent* who deliberates and contemplates my own actions, even though some of this deliberation and contemplation may not happen on a conscious level. The historical world

of such agents is full of responsibilities connected with decisions, and since we are continuously making the environment while being made by it, the sense of our responsibilities is always relational, for the other, for the larger context.

Therefore, from the perspective of the I, since my decisions are situated and implicated in the concrete processes of history, my dialectical involvement with others and with the wider environment is *always already* moral and political. In this sense, history does not “just happen,” but rather is dialectically created through its participants and their decisions, actions, projections, reflections, interpretations, omissions, selections, moral sensibilities, their compassion, understanding, will, and freedom. Nishida’s theory highlights this existential dimension in the dialectical-historical process, and such a dimension includes *us today*. Pure experience and acting intuition, the dialectical universal and its self-determination are not to be found in “books” or in “Nishida’s philosophy,” not in Vol. 7 of Nishida’s *Complete Works* or in a footnote of the Vol. 2 of his *Philosophical Essays*, Vol. II, second edition or wherever. Rather, they are still very much the articulations of the very processes in which we live, theorize, and communicate, here and now. As James Heisig and others have pointed out, Nishida scholarship must open itself up to the world and be a living part of contemporary engagements.¹⁹

We continue a living tradition, a concrete universal in the process of its unfolding. In our current context, Nishida reminds us of the role and place of the I that is embedded in the Here/Now. The eternal present unfolds, and along with it the legacy of Nishida that we carry out in our very actions.

19. For instance, Heisig notes: “The future of Nishida’s philosophy is not served by treating it like Shakespeare’s tragedies or Dante’s *Divine Comedy*. It has rather to be read like all great philosophers: diffused and adapted to as many questions of human life and to as many different historical and linguistic contexts as possible, stretching his ideas to the breaking point until they deliver on their full promise.” HEISIG 2016, 223.

REFERENCES

Abbreviations

NKZ 『西田幾多郎全集』 [Complete Works of Nishida Kitarō], 4th edition, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1987–1980) 19 vols.

Other sources

ARISAKA Yoko 有坂陽子

2017 “The Controversial Cultural Identity of Japanese Philosophy,” Bret Davis, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 755–79.

1996 “The Nishida Enigma: The Principle of the New World Order,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 51/1: 81–99.

DAVIS, Bret

2006 “Toward a World of Worlds: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and the Place of Cross-Cultural Dialogue,” James Heisig, ed., *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy* 1 (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture), 205–45.

2013 “Nishida’s Multicultural Worldview: Contemporary Significance and Immanent Critique,” 西田鉄学会年報 10: 183–203.

FEENBERG, Andrew and ARISAKA Yoko

1990 “Experiential Ontology: The Origins of the Nishida Philosophy in the Doctrine of Pure Experience,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 30/2: 173–205.

GOTO-JONES, Christopher

2005 *Political Philosophy in Japan: Nishida, the Kyoto School, and Co-Prosperity* (London and New York: Routledge).

2008 *Re-Politicising the Kyoto School as Philosophy* (London/New York: Routledge).

HEISIG, James and John MARALDO (eds.)

1994 *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

2016 *Much Ado about Nothingness: Essays on Nishida and Tanabe* (Nagoya: Chisokudō).

JOHNSON, David

2019 *Watsuji on Nature: Japanese Philosophy in the Wake of Heidegger* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).

KOPF, Gereon

2011 “Ambiguity, Diversity and an Ethics of Understanding: What

Nishida's Philosophy Can Contribute to the Pluralism Debate,"
Culture and Dialogue 1/1: 21–44.

MARALDO, John

1995 "The Problem of World Culture: Towards an Appropriation of Nishida's Philosophy of Nation and Culture," *The Eastern Buddhist* 28/2: 183–97.

NISHIDA Kitarō 西田幾多郎

1992 *An Inquiry into the Good* (New Haven: Yale University Press).

ORTEGA, Mariana

2016 *In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self* (Albany: SUNY Press).

TAKAYA Shōko 高谷掌子

2020 「「永遠の今」において隣人を愛する—「無の自覚的限定」における西田とアウグスティヌス」 [Love Your Neighbor in the "Eternal Now": Nishida and Augustine in The Self-Aware Determination of Nothingness] *西田鉄学会年報* 17, 122–36.

