From Expression to Symbol

The Philosophy of Hatano Seiichi in Political Context

Okada Yūsuke

I n this paper, the philosophical anthropology of Hatano Seiichi (波多野精一, 1877–1950) is interpreted as a transition occurring inside of human nature. As one of the towering figures in the so-called Kyoto School, Hatano has engaged in the history of philosophy and Christianity throughout his entire career, with his studies on the philosophy of religion culminating in the trilogy *Philosophy of Religion* (1935), *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (1940), and *Time and Eternity* (1943). While philosophers such as Nishida Kitarō or Nishitani Keiji, who show a certain affinity to Buddhism have been studied intensively as the main stream of the Kyoto School, Hatano, a Christian philosopher, has been more or less ignored for a long time.[1] However, the interpretation of Hatano's history-oriented methodology of philosophy as the "great substream" or even the "hidden mainstream" of the Kyoto School became more dominant in the context of the reorganization of Japan after the war.[2] This paper is, in

---

1. However, this does not mean that Hatano's philosophy has not been studied at all. For an overview of previous research, see Satō 2017b. Also, for Hatano's reception outside of Japan, see Kumazawa 1970.

2. For this evaluation, see Yasukata 2016, 275. Takeda 2012 also helps to acquire the general idea of Hatano's significance to Kyoto School.

this respect, a contribution to the scholarship of Japanese philosophy and the Kyoto school from a new perspective.

In *Time and Eternity*, Hatano deals with philosophical anthropology as a significant element of his philosophy of religion, together with religious typology and the question of the essence of religions.[3] In previous research, Hatano's philosophical anthropology has been explained mainly in terms of his conception of the development of three forms of life, which constitute the whole schema of *Time and Eternity*, namely natural life, cultural life, and religious life.[4] This analysis itself is not wrong or irrelevant, but it can be elaborated to the point where the ethical demand of his philosophical anthropology becomes clearer.

In my view, the core concept of his philosophical anthropology can be described as a *transition from "expression"* (表現) *to "symbol"* (象徴).[5] In this paper, therefore, these two concepts are used to analyze the essential structure of Hatano's philosophical anthropology, or in other words, how human beings are understood in his philosophy of religion, with the theory of the three forms of human life as its background.[6] After this reconstruction, however, Hatano's argument will also be examined and critically evaluated in the religio-political context of wartime Japan.

---

3. For an overview of systematic structure of Hatano's philosophy of religion, see Ashina 2012a.

4. For example, Ban 1995. Basically, Ashina also holds the same view. "Hatano's Philosophical Anthropology can be understood as the development of the temporal structure of human beings, by means of its phenomenological description (from our actual life to the fundamental experience). Namely, the structural analysis of natural and cultural life based on the temporal structure of past, present, and future: this is the content of his philosophical anthropology, and from here nature, culture, and religion are discussed." (Ashina 2012b, 497).

5. As a study of similar interest, see Satō 2007b and 2009. While Satō focuses on the internal structure of the "symbol," the present paper tries to emphasize the meaning of the theory of symbols within the structure of Hatano's whole system, namely his philosophical anthropology in the context of the philosophy of religion.

6. For the sake of clarity of the present argument, the central theme of this work, namely the overcoming of time, is not discussed in this essay.

Hatano's philosophical anthropology
as a transition from expression to symbol

Expression

Philosophical anthropology in general inquires into the nature and character of human beings.[7] The gist of Hatano's view on human beings is that they cannot live without having relationships with others (他者): "The existence of the subject is directed toward others. It gains and maintains itself in the relationship and contact with others."[8] Therefore, the two fundamental concepts of his philosophical anthropology, namely "expression" (表現) and "symbol" (象徵), also need to be explained in this regard. "Expression" is defined by Hatano in the following way: "Now the self-realization of the subject is an act of disclosing something hidden and of revealing itself from its real, existing center to a clearer fringe or surface of ideal being. This may be called 'expression.'"[9]

A human being as a subject (主体) is considered here to have a center or depth, which constitutes the core of his or her personality and which is not to be intruded or possessed by someone else. From this center or core, the subject brings itself to its surface through his or her self-expression and self-assertion. On this surface, the subject can also have contact with others, who are other subjects which have their own center and core.

Although this definition of "expression" is given in the context of "cultural life," this fundamental view on human nature is, in my opinion, also valid for "natural life," the most basic level of human existence.[10] In natural life, "the existing subject stands in an immediate

---

7. Regarding the definition of philosophical anthropology, Hatano writes as follows: "Religion is, first of all, not independent of other fields of life. It is rather connected to them in experience and especially in expression. It is philosophical anthropology which tries to understand this connection from the principle and the whole structure of life." (Hatano 2012b, 103).

8. TE, 7. The translation is sometimes modified for the sake of readability.

9. TE, 15.

10. Since Hatano uses the word "expression" only in the context of cultural life, it should

contact and relationship with the existing others."[11] A subject living in natural life stands in a direct relationship with others as other subjects, and these subjects have the character of self-assertion against others: "The subject insistently asserts its being as reality. In other words, it tries to maintain or even to enlarge its being against others. This is its essential tendency."[12] Although Hatano does not mention the name of Hobbes here explicitly, but the description of natural life reminds us of the image of a *bellum omnium contra omnes* (a war of everyone against everyone).

Here, the subject in natural life faces an unavoidable dilemma with others. On the one hand, as Hatano's fundamental view on human nature claims, human beings cannot live without the relationship with others. They always seek others for the cooperation of life, because the "subject would be dispersed in air and reduced to ashes if there were no others to come into contact with it."[13] However, on the other hand, neither can the subject live completely together with others. In natural life, others are also subjects on their sides, who attempt to assert themselves according to the same principle nature of "expression":

> As natural life is a direct and, therefore, superficial contact or encounter between real existences, for the subject it is a pressure from or invasion by others and a loss of being.[14]

In this sense, being in a direct relationship with others always brings the danger of getting endangered or destroyed by them. Human beings as subjects in the colosseum of natural life can live neither completely with nor without others as other subjects.

---

not be easily identified with the self-assertion of natural life. However, both forms of life share the fundamental tendency of expanding the self by exhausting others (real existing others in natural life or objects in cultural life).

11. TE, 7.
12. TE, 8.
13. TE, 8.
14. TE, 8.

In order to avoid this tragic consequence of natural life, human beings introduce cultural life:

> The word culture [*bunka* 文化] carries an implication of getting rid of the direct linkage with real, existing others or of liberation from the encounter with, the restriction from, or the tension within natural life.[15]

As we have seen in the dilemma mentioned above, the relationship between a subject and others in natural life was one in which one destroys the others or gets destroyed by them. Cultural life tries to overcome this dilemma of natural life and let the subject express itself freely. As Hatano writes, "[t]he essence of cultural life lies in the overcoming of this difficulty as it liberates itself from the pressure and intervention of the others and completely asserts itself in the realm of freedom."[16]

However, how is such a persistent self-expression of the subject still possible, in spite of the dilemma? In cultural life, Hatano explains, the collision between the subject and the others is softened by inserting a buffer between them, which enables them to express themselves without the fear of destroying each other. This buffer is called the "object" (客体): "The liberation and freedom of the subject in cultural life is attained by the formation of its 'object'."[17] Although the pair of the concepts "subject" and "object" is normally employed in the epistemological context of the cognizing subject and the cognized object, this implication is not dominant at all in Hatano's philosophy.[18] What is called an "object" here is referring to all sorts of human activities and their results in a specific cultural context, for example science, art, politics, etc.—although Hatano himself does not give any concrete exam-

15. TE, 13.
16. TE, 13.
17. TE, 14.
18. For the significance of the term "subject" in Hatano's philosophy, see the "Translator's Note" in *Time and Eternity* (TE, 178–9).

ple of culture. Instead of destroying or being destroyed by the other in the direct relationship of natural life, human beings, according to Hatano, decided to pursue their own self-expression in the objective sphere without doing any harm to others directly: discovering a scientific truth, completing a masterpiece of art, making a historical political achievement, and so on. In this process, it is also possible for the subject to be together with others, which is a *conditio sine qua non* for human existence, but which was not realized in natural life. By participating in a culture as the objective sphere from their respective side, subjects are able to be in contact with others in this form of indirect relationship.

> The object is an ideal being, but at the same time, it is an "other" against which the subject asserts itself. But unlike the case of the subject facing directly toward real, existing others, it here develops itself in accordance with the mode of being of the object, and achieves itself not by eliminating the others, but by developing its hidden self in the very others. Self-realization is the basic act of cultural life.[19]

The object as the buffer between subjects has two characteristics. On the one hand, the object has its "otherness" (他者性): it is partly independent of the subject and holds onto its own existence. On the other hand, it has the character of "selfness" (自己性) in relation to the subject at the same time: the object, as a possible form of self, can be employed by the subject for the sake of the subject's self-expression. The object plays, so to speak, the role of a material for the self-expression and self-realization of the subject, as can be seen in the examples of science, art, or politics. "They [the objects] connote material in which the selfhood of the subject will be realized."[20]

However, this two-sided character of the object is the necessary condition for cultural life, which means that, if one of these aspects lacks something, cultural life itself is also in danger of collapsing.

19. TE, 15.
20. TE, 17.

On the one hand, if the "otherness" of the object is strengthened too much, "it will turn into real otherness and culture will be buried in the grave of natural life and its extermination of the self."[21] The strengthened otherness of the object does not allow the subject to take it as the material of self-expression, and hence the subject falls into a state of darkness without self-assertion. On the other hand, extreme reinforcement of the "selfness" of the object means the exhaustion of the materiality of the object by the subject. The subject realizes all its possibilities in the objective realm, which means at the same time the destruction of others by robbing them of the possibilities of their self-expression as other subjects. As a result, this again leads to the self-destruction of the overly self-expressive subject, which results in the loss of others as the counterpart in the relationship of life.

So far, we have seen "(self-)expression" as the fundamental form of the subject and how it functions in cultural (as well as natural) life. While the essence of the subject lies in its self-expression, the subject as a human being cannot live without the relationship with others as other subjects. This two-sided, contradictory nature of human beings constitutes the whole tragedy that they can live neither with nor without others. "The subject, that is, an existence, has two aspects: On the one hand, it takes the form of self-assertion, but on the other, it is related to others, or it can establish its being only as a life toward others. Herein lies the most fundamental problem of life."[22]As long as human beings remain to be subjects of "expression," this tragic consequence cannot be avoided. Here, Hatano claims the necessity of a transition occurring in human nature:

> When the subject enters a completely new fellowship with an other, and both the other and the subject assume entirely new phases, we can expect the coming of eternity. "Love" is the very mode of life which

21. TE, 17.
22. TE, 103.

is completely re-created in this manner. So, we must go beyond the boundary of culture and proceed to the realm of religion.[23]

Symbol

Just as "expression" was the nature of the subject in natural and cultural life, "symbol" is the nature of the subject in religious life. As elements that play a significant role in religions in general as well as in religious studies, symbols are usually understood as earthly signs which indicate or signify the divine: a cross, for example, represents the Atonement of Christ, or a dove in a painting signifies the person of the Holy Spirit in the Trinitarian God, etc.[24] In Hatano's theory, this usage of symbol is of course within range, and it can also be compared with other theories of the symbol, such as the one by Paul Tillich.[25] However, what Hatano calls "the radicalization of symbolism" (象徴の徹底化)[26] goes far beyond most other theories: A "symbol" is not only an objectively appearing sign, but also the fundamental nature of human beings in religious life.[27] Symbols do not only refer to earthly signs which signify transcendence, but also, according to Hatano, to the fact that human beings themselves become symbols of the divine.

In natural and cultural life, others, as counterpart in the relationship of life, are always other human beings—although in cultural life this relationship to other subjects is mediated by another form of "other," i.e. the object. In religious life, however, the term "the other" becomes more ambiguous: it can of course mean other human beings, but also the absolute other, which is conventionally referred to as

23. TE, 102.
24. Concerning the general understanding of "symbol" in religious studies, see BERNER 2004.
25. For a comparison between the theories of symbol between Hatano and Tillich, see ASHINA 2012c.
26. TE, 130.
27. On the question of the significance of Hatano's theory of symbol in contemporary philosophy, see SATŌ 2007b.

"God."[28] Now, the relationship with this absolute other is totally different from that with other human beings in natural and cultural life. Unlike in cultural life, there is no buffer between the subject and the absolute other, and thus the human being needs to stand directly before the divine. Furthermore, according to Hatano, the counterpart in the direct relationship here is the imperishable absolute other, which destroys the human being one-sidedly due to its divinity. The "subject is reduced to ashes in the raging flames of holiness which burn out everything."[29] Burned by the fire of divinity, the human being falls into nothingness.

However, this is not the end of human destiny, but rather the beginning of religious life. "The holy that manifests itself in its absolute reality works not only as a destructive power, but also as a constructive force."[30] Hatano argues that the human being that falls into nothingness is returned to existence once more by means of the work of divine "creation" (創造). According to Hatano's philosophy of religion, this is the meaning of what is normally called "the creation from nothingness." "Then what sort of act is creation as God's love? It is, on the one hand, an act of reducing the other (or human subject in this case) to nothingness and, on the other, of calling it out of nothingness and bringing it into being, i.e. into a real otherness which exists and which possesses the center of its life."[31] For Hatano, "existence" means nothing but continuous creation (連続的創造),[32] which happens not only once at the mythological beginning of the world but continu-

28. In the preface to his *Philosophy of Religion*, Hatano denotes "the counterpart of the subject in religious experience" as "God." (Hatano 2012b, 169). Therefore, although Hatano's philosophy of religion is clearly characterized by Christianity, this term "God" should not be understood as the Trinitarian God but the god of philosophy in the general sense. In the translation of *Time and Eternity*, the terms "God" and "god" coexist seemingly without any rules. Even in the "Translator's Note" (175–81), there is no mention to of this problem of translation.

29. TE, 119.

30. TE, 119.

31. TE, 121.

32. TE, 183.

ously prevents the subject from falling into nothingness. This creation enables the human subject to enter into a new relationship with the other in religious life.

So, what is the nature of the subject in this new relationship with the other? Unlike in natural and cultural life, one cannot express oneself to the divine, which is the absolute counterpart of the relationship. Here, the concept of "symbol" needs to be re-described in contrast with "expression":

> Unlike expression, "symbol" comes into being in relationship or fellowship with really existing others. When the contents of the life of the subject are alienated into objects and obtain the meaning of a mere form of the subject, they are called expressions; whereas when the same contents are related to the center of a really existing being which transcends the realm of the subject, responsible for disclosing not the self but others, and indicating or representing a really existing other being, they are called symbols.[33]

On the one hand, in "expression," as the most basic mode of being in cultural life (and as a fundamental tendency also in natural life), the subject expresses itself and seeks its self-realization against others in the objective sphere of culture (or in the direct relationship of nature). What is expressed here is "the self" of the subject. On the other hand, what is expressed or represented in a "symbol" is "the other," i.e. God. In this context, a "symbol" is not a mere thing or image such as a cross or a dove, but the renewed nature of the human being in religious life, which is not the expression of the self but that of the (absolute) other. "In this manner, the human subject, after giving up all its being without remainder, including not only the content of its life but also its center, and abandoning its entire self as well as its self-realization, becomes, indeed is urged to become itself a perfect symbol of the other."[34]

According to Hatano, this form of "symbol" as a mode of being

33. TE, 19.
34. TE, 130.

in the context of religious life is the only way to solve the dilemma of the expressing subject in natural and cultural life. On the one hand, concerning the necessity of being in a relationship with the other, the subject and its relationship are established by the counterpart of this relationship, i.e. God, through creation. On the other hand, concerning the necessity of self-expression of the subject, the subject expresses itself by expressing the other. Being a "symbol" in religious life, what the other expresses is identical with what the subject wishes to express. This is what Hatano calls the "thoroughgoing symbolization" of the subject, where "what God sees and wants will become what we see and want and we shall do nothing other than fulfill what God ordains us to do."[35] Through the "symbol," as this renewed nature of the subject in religious life, through a turn from the self-centered expression to the other-centered symbol, cooperation with the other becomes truly possible.

Furthermore, for Hatano, the other also in the religious life is not only the divine other but also the human other. Once the vertical relationship between the subject and God is established, the horizontal relationship between the subject and its human "thou" is also considered. In religious life, God also creates this "thou" who gives up self-expression and lives the life of the symbol of God and human others. Since the subject and its "thou" are both symbols of the loving divine, they are also the subjects of mutual love. "Thus by the grace of love and creation of the absolute other, the holy one, the 'Thou' which is love comes into being along with the love of the self, whereby and wherewith the subject also becomes the 'Thou' which is loved."[36] Thus, they do not exist in the colosseum of self-expression anymore, where they end up destroying each other, but in the relationship of mutually representing symbols, which Hatano calls—in accordance with the traditional Christian creed—a *communio sanctorum* (communion of saints) in which the individual subjects not only symbolize God but

35. TE, 131.
36. TE, 139.

also each other: "A person in whom God is symbolized in pure form thereby becomes also the pure symbol of the other person."[37] Giving up its own self-expression, the subject as a symbol of God and human others lives in the true relationship of love.

CRITICAL EVALUATION: A GENEALOGY OF SELF-SACRIFICE?

So far, the essential structure of Hatano's philosophical anthropology has been examined, following the line of thought in his main work *Time and Eternity*. Based on the interpretation of the human being as a self-expressing subject, Hatano constructed the idea of the symbol as an other-centered devotion, which is designed to overcome the dilemma of the subject facing others.

From a philosophical perspective, his theory of "the other" can be compared with some tendencies in contemporary French philosophy, where the significance of "the other" becomes a principle for philosophical reflection.[38] From a religious perspective, the symbol as other-centered devotion can be interpreted as the philosophical formulation of the Christian virtue of the self-sacrifice. This observation is not surprising if we take into consideration that Christianity is Hatano's own belief and his philosophy of religion is also clearly based on it. When Hatano philosophically describes his anthropology of expression and symbol, he does not hesitate to give his explanations in traditional Christian terms, such as "love," "agape," "grace," and so on. Thus, following his own definition that the "philosophy of religion has to be a theoretical retrospection and reflective self-understanding of religious experience,"[39] Hatano succeeded in giving a sophisticated "the-

37. TE, 139.
38. For a comparison with Levinas, see KATAYANAGI 1998. Satō also tries a comparison between Tanabe, Hatano, and Jean-Luc Marion. See SATŌ 2007A.
39. HATANO 2012B, 11.

oretical reflection" on his "religious experience" characterized without doubt by Christianity.

However, although the value of his philosophy of religion is already acknowledged in the history of Japanese philosophy, it needs to be assessed from another perspective. In recent literature on Hatano's work, researchers have tried to trace the relationship between his philosophy and his cultural background in Japan.[40] It is true that Hatano's philosophy is constructed in a purely western manner without any reference to Japanese or eastern elements, unlike other philosophers of the Kyoto School such as Nishida Kitarō who show a stronger inclination towards Buddhism. But recent research has also been focusing on his particular situation in history, namely Japan during the Second World War (*Time and Eternity* was published in 1943). To summarize theseresearches, it can be said that at first glance Hatano was more or less critical of the war-time atmosphere in Japan at that time, and at least did not support the national ideology as actively as in the case of some other members of the Kyoto School.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, it could be argued that, regardless of his intention, Hatano's philosophy of religion could be said to have an affinity with the nationalistic ideology at that time, namely the affinity between his self-sacrificial ethics of "symbol" and the mentality of Japanese totalitarianism, which insists on "annihilating the self, serving the public" (滅私奉公). As could be seen in the structural analysis above, the discourse of "symbol" in *Time and Eternity* was filled with the ideal of self-sacrifice, which demands of the subject to become the expression of the other in the form of God and fellow human beings. Of course, there is no doubt that Hatano intended to present this

40. Analysing Hatano's correspondences, Muramatsu argues that he was more or less critical of the Pacific War and Japanese colonial invasion in spite of being a so-called "old liberalist." There he expresses his opinion mainly as an intellectual, and specific perspective as a Christian can hardly be found. (MURAMATSU 2006, 2007, 2014) Following Dominick Lacapra's method of intellectual history, Ashina tries to show from the original text of *Time and Eternity* that Hatano could be expressing an implicit criticism of the totalitarian Japanese regime at that time. (ASHINA 2016)

view as a purely theoretical philosophy of religion and philosophical anthropology concerned with human nature in front of the divine. However, the question remains what kind of meaning this discourse had for his readers in a quasi-religious totalitarian regime, where the nation and the Japanese emperor as its head were almost identical with the divine in the eyes of most Japanese.

The following example might give us a clue as to what kind of impression the self-sacrificial discourse in *Time and Eternity* could have given its readers. Hatano here argues about the "preparedness for death" (決死) in religious life.

> We often talk about the nobility of preparedness for death. But it is not in itself noble to determine to die. For example, suicide as a means of escaping the sufferings of this world is self-contradictory stupidity, in so far as it is carried out under the hypothesis that death is a continuation of life. At the same time, it is a cowardly escaping of one's own responsibility. Generally speaking, a reckless suicide is an attempt to dispose by oneself of what is at the disposal of the Other and, to that extent it is a blasphemy toward the Divine Being.[41]

In this quote, Hatano criticizes the all too simple mindset of "preparedness for death." In this case, death is seen as an escape from one's own suffering and responsibility, which could even mean blasphemy towards the divine because one tries to control what should actually be controlled by God. Ashina takes up this viewpoint and interprets it as an implicit allusion to the Japanese situation in 1943, where the atmosphere of "preparedness for death" (for the nation) was dominant throughout the country. Considering the context of religious life in Hatano's work, Ashina argues that it should be read as a criticism

41. TE, 159. The original Japanese text is as follows: 「人は決死の尊さについて語る。しかしながら死の決心をなすことそのことが尊いのではない。例えば、この世の苦悩を遁れんがための決死は、死を生の存続となす前提の上に立つものとして、自己矛盾を含む愚挙であるが、更に自己の責任を遁れようとする卑怯の振舞でさえある。総じて軽々しく死を決するは、他者に委ねらるべきものを自ら処理しようとするものであって、神聖者に対する冒涜である」。（HATANO 2012A, 225–6）.

of this all too simple atmosphere of "preparedness for death" at that time and as a presentation of what preparedness is really about, i.e. only as a response to the divine love in religious life.[42] However, even if we admit this as a possible interpretation of the cited passage, it is still worth questioning how the passage that immediately follows after the quote above sounded to the readers at that time, a time in which it was quite common to think that the ongoing war was supported by a divine will in a nationalistic as well as religious sense.

> On the other hand, preparedness or readiness [for death] as a response to the word of the Holy or the calling of God, which comes from the awareness of one's responsibility and duty, is a sparkle of pure love in answering the glimmer of eternity or divine love. As one reaches this stage, which is a step further, he will accept even death as grace.[43]

The true "preparedness for death," according to Hatano, is possible in the name of "pure love," as a response to "the calling of God." And at this stage, death—as the result of this love—is even "grace." In Christian literature, many such statements on self-sacrifice can be found, having their origin already in the Bible: "Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."[44] However, the meaning of a statement differs according to its context, where, in this case, it might be implied that self-sacrifice stemming "from the awareness of one's responsibility and duty" is required not only for individual neighbours but also for the nation. Although it could be argued that Hatano himself did not intend such an implication, the affinity of religious and nationalistic discourses on self-sacrifice at his time invites us to think about the political responsibility of philosophy, even if it seems to be purely theoretical at first glance.

42. ASHINA 2013.
43. TE, 159f.「これに反して、神聖者の言葉・召しに応じての、責任と本分との自覚よりしての決死は、真の永遠の閃き、神聖なる愛に答える純真なる愛の輝きである。ここまで達すれば、人は更に一歩を進めて死そのものをも恵みとして受けるであろう」。(HATANO 2012a, 226).
44. JOHN 15: 13. The translation is taken from the King James Version.

Conclusion

In this essay, the philosophical anthropology of Hatano Seiichi was described and analyzed against the backdrop of his scheme of the three levels of human life. As we have already seen, we can conclude that the core of his philosophical anthropology can be interpreted as a transition from expression to symbol. However, at the same time, we have also pointed out in a manner of ideological criticism that Hatano's theory of symbol implies a character of self-sacrifice which could have an affinity with the nationalistic discourse of his time, once his philosophy of religion is put in its historical context.

As a further prospect of this research, it can be connected to the problem of the logic of self-sacrifice in the philosophy of religion in general. While self-sacrifice is seen as an ideal of traditional religious ethics not only in Christianity but also in other religions such as Buddhism, it is always in danger of being caught up in a different framework such as nationalism or Japanese culture, where individuals are required to "read the atmosphere" (空気を読む) and suppress their self-expression for the benefit or harmony of the group. In this connection, it is also possible to point out the general tendency of an "aestheticization of (self-)sacrifice" in Japanese history, from suicide attacks in times of war to the contemporary devotion to work unto death (過労死). In this sense, it is not only a question for religious ethics or the philosophy of religion, but also for the study of contemporary Japanese society.

Takahashi Tetsuya, a contemporary Japanese philosopher and critic of Japanese quasi-religious nationalistic ideology,[45] criticizes the Christian logic of sacrifice in general,[46] and self-sacrifice is without doubt one of the specific forms of this logic of sacrifice. One could go so far as to ask whether ethics in the philosophy of religion is even possible without the logic of sacrifice. In my opinion, self-sacrifice is so

---

45. For example, see Takahashi 2005.
46. Takahashi 2012. In the field of Christian theology, also see Kohara 2018.

deeply embedded in religious ethics and so essential to it that it is not realistic to conceive of the latter without the former. An acknowledgement of the value of particular religions in history (in other words, positive religions) is also one of the principles of the methodology of Hatano's philosophy of religion.[47]

If one wants to keep the great insights of particular religions instead of abandoning them, the problem rather needs to be raised in this way: How is self-sacrifice without any compulsion from outer ideology possible? Admitting the theoretical achievement of Hatano's philosophy of religion, we always have to take the specific context into consideration if we engage in the research of Japanese philosophy.

REFERENCES

Abbreviations

TE HATANO Seiichi: *Time and Eternity*, trans. by Suzuki Ichirō (Tokyo: Yūshōdō).

Other Sources

ASHINA Sadamichi 芦名定道
2012a 「解説」[Introduction],『宗教哲学序論・宗教哲学』[Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion/ Philosophy of Religion], 岩波書店, 525–547.
2012b 「解説」[Introduction],『時と永遠：他八篇』[Time and Eternity: Including Eight Other Essays], 岩波書店, 485–506.
2012c 「宗教的実在と象徴：波多野とティリッヒ」[Religious Reality and Symbol: Hatano and Tillich],『近代／ポスト近代とキリスト教』[Modernity/Postmodernity and Christianity], 3–22.
2013 「波多野宗教哲学における死の問い」[The Question of Death in Hatano's Philosophy of Religion],『キリスト教学研究室紀要』[Annual Report on Christian Studies] 1: 1–17.
2016 『近代日本とキリスト教思想の可能性：二つの地平が交わるところにて』[The Potentiality of Modern Japan and Christian Thought: At the Crossroads of Two Horizons], 三恵社.

47. HATANO 2012a, 258.

Ban Hiroshi　伴 博
　1995 「波多野精一における哲学的人間学」［Philosophical Anthropo-
　　　 logy in Hatano Seiichi］,『早稲田大学大学院文学研究科紀要』［Bul-
　　　 letin of the Graduate Division of Literature of Waseda University］
　　　 41/1: 3–19.

Hatano Seiichi　波多野精一
　2012a 『時と永遠：他八篇』［Time and Eternity, with Eight Other Essays］,
　　　　 岩波書店.
　2012b 『宗教哲学序論・宗教哲学』［Introduction to the Philosophy of
　　　　 Religion; The Philosophy of Religion］, 岩波書店.

Katayanagi Eiichi　片柳榮一
　1998 「時と永遠：波多野精一」［Time and Eternity: Hatano Seiichi］
　　　 『日本の哲学を学ぶ人のために』［A Companion to Japanese Philo-
　　　 sophy］, 常俊宗三郎(編), 世界思想社, 257–86.

Kohara Katsuhiro　小原克博
　2018 「犠牲の論理とイエスの倫理」［The Logic of Sacrifice and the Ethic
　　　 of Jesus］『福音と世界』［The Gospel and the World］2018年3月号, 新
　　　 教出版社, 6–11.

Kumazawa Yoshinobu　熊沢義宣
　1970 「外国人のみた波多野宗教哲学」［Hatano's Philosophy of Reli-
　　　 gion as Seen from Abroad］『追憶の波多野精一先生』［Prof. Seiichi
　　　 Hatano in Retrospect］, 115–18.

Muramatsu Susumu　村松 晋
　2006 「波多野精一と敗戦」［Seiichi Hatano and the Defeat of the Paci-
　　　 fic War］『聖学院大学論叢』［Journal of Seigakuin University］19/1:
　　　 61–72.
　2007 「波多野精一の時代認識」［Recognition of the Times in Hatano
　　　 Seiichi］,『聖学院大学論叢』［Journal of Seigakuin University］,
　　　 vol.19 (2), 139–146.
　2014 『近代日本精神史の位相：キリスト教をめぐる思索と経験』［Phases of
　　　 Modern Japanese Intellectual History: The Contemplation and
　　　 Experience of Christianity］聖学院大学出版会, 2014.

Satō Keisuke　佐藤啓介
　2007a 「愛ゆえに、我在り：田辺、波多野、マリオンと存在- 愛- 論」［*Amo, ergo
　　　　 sum*: Tanabe, Hatano, Marion and Onto-agape-ology］『ディアロゴ
　　　　 ス：手探りの中の対話』［*Dialogos*: In Search of a Way to Dialogue］,
　　　　 片柳榮一(編), 晃洋書房, 216–36.

2007B 「波多野精一の存在-愛-論：無からの創造論に注目して」[Hatano on Being and Love: With an Eye on the Theory of *Creatio ex nihilo*] 『日本の神学』[Theological study in Japan], vol.46, 31–52.

2009 「神の言葉の器としての人間：波多野精一の象徴論の存在論的再解釈をめざして」[The Human Being as a Vessel of the Words of God: An Ontological Reinterpretation of Hatano's Theory of Symbolism] 『聖学院大学論叢』[Journal of Seigakuin University] 22/1: 181–9.

TAKAHASHI Tetsuya 高橋哲哉

2005 『靖国問題』[Controversies surrounding Yasukuni Shrine], 筑摩書房.

2012 「内村鑑三と犠牲 」[Uchimura Kanzō and Sacrifice]『神こそわれらの砦：内村鑑三生誕 150 周年記念』[A Mighty Fortress is our God: 150th Anniversary of Uchimura Kanzō's Birth], 今井教友館(編), 教文館、74–86.

TAKEDA Atsushi 竹田篤司

2012 『物語「京都学派」―知識人たちの友情と葛藤』[The Story of the "Kyoto School": Friendships and Conflicts among Intellectuals] 中央公論新社 (同社, 中公叢書, 2001年).

BERNER, Ulrich

2004 "Symbol/ Symbole/ Symboltheorien I. Religionswissenschaftlich," *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Band 7 (R-S), hg. v. Hans Dieter Betz, Don S. Browning, Bernd Janowski und Eberhard Jüngel, 4. Auflage (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck).

YASUKATA Toshimasa 安酸敏眞

2016 『欧米留学の原風景：福沢諭吉から鶴見俊輔へ』[The Changing Environment for Japanese Students in the West: From Fukuzawa Yukichi to Tsurumi Shunsuke], 知泉書館.